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AN ESSA Y ON HUMAN ENTERPRISE OF LAW 
IN THE MODERN WORLD 
Mitsukuni Y ASAKI* 
1 Between “Fonnal" and “Infonnal" 
1 happened to hear in the barber the radio saying that there is a great 
difference， and notice it， of women's “fonnal" wear between Japanese 
Kimono and the Western. They may attend any“fonnal" party (like for 
celebration for marriage) by wearing definite type of Kimono (Susomoyδ) 
and even walk around street in this style， whi1e they are customarily to wear 
each different type of the Western “fonnal" wears in accordance with the 
conditions whether morning， or afternoon， or night， inorder to do so. 
Then， 1 wonder what “fonnal" and "infonnal" is. “Barefoot on the 
Park" may be informa1. But， how can we draw a c1ear border1ine between 
“fonnal" and “infonnal"? 
There must be， so to speak， an overlapping or penumbral area difficu1t to 
make such a distinction. How about the legal world we are involved in? 
We may perhaps find a similar situation here. 
People， having each position and playing each role in the ordinary socia1 
wor1d， do behave in their own appropriate way and rea1ize their idea through 
that behavior， but some of their idea realizing behaviors resu1t and response 
to the Iaw-institution as a part of social institution. The law is often said and 
thought of “fonnaI" in terms of means to control and guidance to support 
private and official conduct under the possible守imitationsof administrator's 
and judge's arbitrary intervention. Such a “fonnal" law is typically seen in 
the code， par1iamentary enactments， but aIso in the case law， sometimes even 
in the customary Iaw. Those fonnal character has been grasped in conneひ
tion with generality， abstraction， strictness， and lack of flexibility. Though 
fonnality of the law conceived from the procedural aspect is relevant to this 
* Professor of G巴nera1Jurisprudence， Facu1ty of Law， Osaka University， L.L. D. Tokyo Univer-
sity， 1ヲ68.
2 OSAKA UNIVERSITY LA W REVfEW [No.27 
topic， 1 shall put aside it here as treated before. 
The usage of word “formal" law， however， isnot certain and obvious. 
Even formal rationality of the law in M. Weber's sense， asoften remarked， 
shows some difficu1ty for its understanding as f;訂 aslegal system and 
thoughts in Continent， especially Germany and in England (and America) are 
concerned.l) Apart from this， another problem will be raised in regard to 
the point how to critically deal with various limits of the “formal" municipal 
law， especially viewed from the contemporary situation now we are faced 
with. Famous legal theoreticians' ideas， like E. Ehrlich's， H. U. 
Kantorowicz's，話.Weber's， and so on， will offer illuminating classical ex四
amples which 1 shall brief1y refer to below. Before specifically treating it， 
it's better for us， 1 think， to remember a wider range of the word law， not 
only limited to the “formal"， in order to have a wider perspective， or a 
bird 's-eye view available to grasp some meaning of matters legal surrounding 
us at present. 
1) According to a relatively dominant interpretation， Weber saw logicalかformalrationality as 
typically developed in German law and legal thought coming from the Pandekten tradition by con. 
trast with English common law or case law and thought. Though admittedly Weber treated the 
problem in such a way， he also appears to see formal rationality as a predictability or calculability 
not only in German， but in English law and thought under various limitations， for instance by 
omitting the field of Justice of Peace. For白巴 understandingof the latter， the next passage must 
be helpful: "Der moderne kapitalistische Betrieb ruht innerlich vor allem auf der Kalkulation. Er 
braucht fur seine Existenz eine Justiz und Verwaltung， deren Funktionieren wenigstens im Prinzip 
巴bensoan festen generellen Normen rational kalkuliert werden kann， wie man die voraussichtliche 
Leistung einer Maschine kalkuliert.ーー-Die modernen Betriebsformen mit ihrem st巴hendenKapital 
und ihrer exakten Kalkulation舗梯帥 konntennur da entst巴hen，wo entweder， wie in England， die 
praktische Gestaltung des Rechts tats証chlichin den H証ndender Advokaten lag， welche im Dienste 
ihrer Kundschaft: der kapitalistischen Interessenten also， die geeigneten Gesch証ftsformenersann巴n，
und aus deren Mitte dann die streng an "Prazedenzfalle"， also an berechenbare Schemata gebundenen 
Richter hervorgingen. Oder wo der Richter wie im bureaukratischen Staat mit seinen rationalen 
Gesetzen， mehr oder minder ein Paragraphen # Automat ist， inwelchen man oben di巴 Aktennebst 
den Kosten und Gebuhren hineinwirft， auf dass er unten das Urteil nebst den mehr oder minder 
sichhaltigen Grunden ausspiele: - dessen Funktionieren also jedenfalls加1grossen und ganzen 
kakulierbar ist. 一一“M.Weber， Gesammelte politische Schriften， 142f (1920). Moreover， M. Yasaki， 
The rational law of civil society and th巴juristicoutlook of the world， in: Theory of Private Law 
(J apanese version)， a special issue，巴d.by Japan Association of Legal Philosophy， 186ff (1951).， and， 
Legal Formalism Reconsidered， 24 Osaka Univ. L. Rev.， Not巴14at 5f (1977). Also， see as a few 
examples of dominant interpretaions， M. Rehbinder， Max Webers Rechtssoziologie， in: Max Weber 
zum Gedachtnis， herausg. von R Konig und 1. Winckelmann， 1963， 48lff.， D. M. Trubek， Max Web巴E
on law and the rise of capitalism， Wisconsin L. Rev.， 720ff (1972).， 
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1 Variety of Informal Control Systems 
The type of law of formal character is certainly the type for laymen 
ready to imagine， but it is also sure that a wider range of the word law is not 
exhausted to designate that type. We may immediately point out a series of 
each different types of informal control systems perhaps very relevant to 
that wider range of the word law: 
1. informal control system which plays a decisive role of control in so聞
cial relationships deeply interwoven with traditional way of life (pe子
haps rural community is an example as explained by E. Ehrlich). 
2. informal way of dispute幽set1ementprior or post to the official for-
mal administration of justice within municipallegal system. 
3. informal control system working at various levels of modern social 
relationships: within each group of mass media， medical profession， 
legal profession， even scientists. 
4. informal judgement which is typically made in the so called hard case 
by reference to material standard of judgement when any relevant 
legal provision seems hard to be found in the official formal adminis-
tration of justice. To use late prof. H. U. Kantorowicz's phrase， it
may be closed to free law to be replaced in the lack of formallaw. 
5. To sum up， the matter of facts called “informal" so far will be found 
everywhere， either within， or outside the judicial decisioIトmaking
process， that is， interpretation and application of formal municipal 
law. 
6. Main problem， as far as Japan is concerned， ishow to classify each 
different aspects of informal control system and to what extent they 
are peculiar to the informal in J apan and otherwise “informal" in a 
sense of universally valid in the world. 2) 
2) The point 1. mainly means "lebendes Recht“or "lebendiges Recht“a significance of which is 
impressively pointed out by E. Ehr1ich. It is worth noticing that he makes an emphasis on the living 
law not only in the rural community， but even within the monopolistic organization in the capitalistic 
society at the beginning of 20th century Germany. Ehrlich， Sozia1e Frage und die Rechtsordnung， 9 
Jg. Die Neue Zeit， 543 (1891). cf. M. Nishimura， An enquiry in the formation of legal sociology in 
Germany， 28 Studies in Legal History-， 巴d.by Japan Association of Legal History， 37f.， 45 (1978). 
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The point 4， attracts our attention， asitis a familiar topic of nature of 
judicial process， and it is also related to the topic mentioned above. As an 
illustration， 1 shall cite the passage written by H. U. Kantorowicz. 
11 Kantorowicz and Free Law 
“Law is either formal ]aw， i.e.， law having undergone and completed a 
definite process of formation or integration， or‘怜eelaw，" i.e.， law which 
has not completed these processes. In both cases it is either explicit law 
(gesetz tes Recht)， i. e.， a rule which has been explicit1y dec1ared to be law， or 
implicit law， i. e.， a rule which is recognizable as law by significant actions 
(concludente Handlungen). Free law is infinitely greater practical impor-
tance than formal law， a lawsuit being generally superfluous if the case in 
question is really determined by genuine formal1aw".3) 
It seems to me that Kantorowicz tries to draw a panoramatic picture of 
formallaw relatively separate from and yet relatively supplemented with free 
law. A Formal1aw is 1. formal explicit law: (a) statutes， (b) orders in 
council， rules of court， by-laws， ordinances， regulations， etc.， (c) case law， or 
judge幽madelaw， and 2. formal implicit law， namely customary in its usual 
sense. There is no great difference between this“formal" law and that men-
tioned above. Then， what is free law resembling to some of “informal" con-
trol system? 
B “Free law may be divided into: 1. nascent law， namely law， that 
would be formal law， ifit had undergone and completed the process of for-
mation， instead of only having entered into it; 2. desired law， namely law 
which those who apply it desire to become formal law".4) Kantorowicz， 
furthermore， points out both forms again being either (a) explicit law， or 
The point 2. mainly means informal way of dispute-settlem巴ntin case~ such as like the recent 
nuisance probl巴ms，environm巴ntalproblems， etc. As to the general problem of“informal control 
systems"， 1 could come to deal with each of them altogether for the occasion of “Forum on Legal 
Culture" held at Kyoto in Dec. 18， 1979， and 1 am very grateful to Professors Z. Kitagawa， R.D. 
Schwartz， M. Rehbinder. 
3) H. U. Kantorowicz & E. W. Patterson， Legal science-A summary of its methodology， 28 
Columb. L. Rev. 679，692 (1928). 
4) 3)693. 
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(b) imp1icit law， consequently four forms of free law to be divided. Within 
four， that is， nascent explicit law (B 1 a)， desired exp1icit law (B2a)， nascent 
imp1icit law (Blb)， desired imp1icit law (B2b)， Bla appe訂srather closed to 
forrnal law than others， because it incIudes the rules as may be concluded 
from the preparatory stages (motivations， debates， etc.) of the statute， and 
so on. Others include various stages of the rules from the rule like Art. 1 of 
the Swiss Civil Code through new customs， mere standards referred to in 
connection with boni mores， nature of things， equity， exigencies of 1ife to 
judicial practice.5) 
Let us reconsider what is merit or demerit of this doctrine. Kantorowicz 
with self-confident counts its merits as follows: 
“All these six forrns of law are required by the necessity of possessing 
a rule of law for the decision of any imaginable case which， on account of 
the incompleteness of the existing forrnal law， would be impossible， ifthe 
rules of free law could not be app1ied. They are further required to solve the 
problem arising from the fact that， on the one hand， itcannot be honestly 
denied that very often， and especiaIly in the Anglo-Saxon countries， judges 
create new forrnallaw， and that， on the other hand， one could not accept the 
view that the decided case was governed， before the decision of the judge， by 
no law at al， or by a contrary forrnal law. This problem is solved， ifwe 
recognize that such cases were governed by free law. "6) 
It is clear that he takes a careful attitude to the judiciallaw-making and 
pays a special attention on the side of preexisting (free)“law" idea prior 
even to the decision of hard cases， which appears for us to make an 
interesting contrast to his forrner challenging idea of so-caIled “contra 
legem". This attitude may be more interesting for us in giving a s卸lIlar
impression with the so聞ca11ed “principles"idea do when appealed to 
principles， or standards to justify right or entitlement in the treatment of 
hard cases.7) But， generally Kantorowicz only refers to free law or rules 
5) 3)694-7. 
6) 3) 693f. 
7) Idea paying a speciaI emphasis on principles or standards as distinct from policies has been 
particular1y adopted and promoted by R. M. Dworkin in his long series of articles which釘巴
crystalized to“Taking Rights seriously" (1977). Though 1 don't touch this point here， 1 only 
mentioned to some formative factors of that idea. See Yasaki， Notes on history of the Western legal 
thought， 273 Hogaku Seminar， 82-3 (1977)， and 275， note 18 at p.81 (1978)， and 292， note 16 at 
114 (1979). 
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instead of principles. 
His catalogue of “free law" may well serve as a useful tool to reconstruct 
each different， slippery， and elusive types of infonnal control systems into 
reliable and visible framework as perhaps seen， for instance， inthe case of 
infonnal autonomous control system of medical profession which in turn 
will find an end-result in the confinnation or rejection through judicia1 
practice. But， itconcerns merely some of the matter infonnal. 
IV Weber and Free Law 
The sujet matter of Kantorowicz must have been the same concern of 
his col1egue and senior friend， M. Weber. If so， why Weber has been said and 
thought as if he was against such a free law movement in favor of municipal 
fonnal law? According to his writings Weber seems to leave evidences 
dubious to decide either. On the one hand， he certainly sets forth: 
円Die~ freirecht1iche~ Doktrin unternimmt den Nachweis， das dies Ver-
sagen das prinzipielle Schicksal aller Gesetze gegenuber der Irrationalitat 
der Tatsachen， das also in zahlreichen Fal1en die Anwendung der blosen 
Interpretation nur Schein sei und die Entscheidung nach konkreten Wertab-
wagungen， nicht nach formalen Normen， erfolge und erfolgen musse. Der 
bekannte， inseiner praktischen Tragweite frei1ch oft uberschatzte Art. 1 
des Schweizerischeri Zivi1gesetzbuches， wonach der Richter mangels ein-
deutiger Auskunft des Gesetzes nach der Regel entscheiden sol1e， welche er 
selbst als Gesetzgeber aufstellen wurde， entspricht zwar fonnal bekannten 
KANTischen Formulierungen. Der Sache nach wurde aber eine Judikatur， 
we1che den gedachten Idealen entsprache， angesichts der Uvenneidlichkeit 
von Wertkompromissen， von einer Bezugnahme auf solche abstrakten 
Nonnensehr oft ganz absehen und mindestens im Konfliktsfal1 ganz 
konkrete Wertungen， also nicht nur unformale， sondern auch irrationale 
Rechtsfindung， zulassen mussen.“8) 
Here he worries court's decision being fallen into the hand of solely 
concrete valueてjudgement，therefore even irrational， sti1 les informal law-
8) M. Weber， Rechtssoziologie-Aus dem Manuskript herausg. und eingel. von J. Winckelmann， 
281 (1960). 
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finding and he indirectly seems to criticize such a tendency immanent in law， 
judicial practice and theory in Germany at that time. In addition， he writes 
furthermore. : 
"Das man heute diesem subjektiven Glauben gerade der anerkannt 
erheblichsten Juristen den objektiv anders liegenden Tatbestand entgegen-
ha1t und aus diesem nun die Norm fur das subjektive Verha1ten machen 
mochte， ist-mag man sich zu dem Verlangen stel1en wie immer -jedenfal1s 
Produkt intel1ektualistischer Desil1usionierung. Die a1te Stel1ung des 
englischen Richters durfte mit Fortschreiten der Burokratisierung und der 
Rechtssatzung auf die Dauer stark erschuttert werden. Ob man aber einen 
burokratischen Richter in Landern mit kodifiziertem Recht dadurch al1ein 
zu einem Rechtspropheten machen wird， das man ihm die Krone des 
> Schöpfers~ aufdruckt， istnicht sicher. Jedenfal1s aber wird die juristische 
Prazision der Arbeit， wie sie sich in den UrteilsgfUnden ausspricht， ziemlich 
stark herabgesetzt werden， wenn soziologische und okonomische oder 
ethische Rasonnements an die Stelle juristischer Begriffe treten. -Die 
Bewegung ist， al1es in al1em， einer der charakteristischen Ruckschlage gegen 
die Herrschaft des >Fachmenschentums~ und den Rationalismus， der 
freilich letztlich ihr eigener Vater ist.“9) 
But， Weber really took negative attitude to the free law movement? 
In the fol1owing passage he appears to write in a descritive way: 
"J edenfa11s also zeigt die Entwicklung der formel1en Qualitaten des 
Rechts eigentumlich gegensatzliche Zuge. Streng formalistisch und am 
Sinnfalligen haftend， soweit die geschaft1iche Verkehrssícherh~it es verlangt， 
ist es im Interesse der gesc凶 ftlichenVerkehrsloyalitat unformal， soweit die 
logische Sinninterpretation des Parteiwil1ens oder die in der Richtung eines 
> ethischen Minimums< gedeutete > gute Verkehrssitte< es bedingen.“ 
Furthermore， he takes into consideration relevant various factors: 
円Eswird dafUber hinaus in antiformale Bahnen gedrangt durch ale 
diejenigen Gewa1ten， welche an die Rechtspraxis den Anspruch stel1en， etwas 
anderes als ein Mittel befriedeten Interessenkampfes zu sein. Also durch 
materiale Gerechtigkeitsforderungen sozialer Klasseninteressen und 
Ideologien， durch die auch heute wirksame Natur bestimmter politischer， 
9) 8) 289. 
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speziell autokratischer und demokratischer， Herrschaftsformen sowie 
derjenigen Anschauungen uber den Zweck des Rechtes， welche ihnen 
adaquat sind， und durch die Forderung der T Laien~ nach einer ihnen ver-
standlichen Justiz. Endlich unter Umstanden auch， wie wir sahen， durch 
ideologisch begrundete Machtanspruche des Juristenstandes selbst.“ 
Weber's seemingly conc1uding remark is as follows: 
"Wie immer aber sich unter diesen Einflussen das Recht und die 
Rechtspraxis gesta1ten mogen， unter allen Umstanden ist als Konsequenz der 
technischen und okonomischen Entwicklung， allem Laienrichtertum zum 
Trotz， die unvermeidlich zunehmende Unkenntnis des an technischem 
Gehalt stetig anschwellenden Rechts auf seiten der Laien， also die 
Fachmasigkeit des Rechts， und die zunehmende Wertung des jewei1s 
geltenden Rechts als eines rationalen， daher jederzeit zweckrational 
umzuschaffenden， jeder inhaltlichen Heiligkeit entbehrenden， technischen 
Apparats sein unvermeidliches Schicksal. Dieses Schicksal kann durch die 
aus a11gemeinen Grunden vielfach zunehmende Fugsamkeit in das einmal 
bestehende Recht zwar verschleiert， nicht aber wirklich von ihm abgewendet 
werden. Alle die kurz erwahnten modemen， wissenschaftlich oft hochst 
wertvollen Dar1egungen rechtssoziologischer und rechtsphilosophischer Art 
werden nur dazu beitragen， diesen Eindruck zu verstarken， mogen sie 
ihrerseits Theorien uber die Natur des Rechts und die Stellung des Richters 
vertreten， we1chen Inhalts immer.“ 10) 
Informal control systems especially in connection with judicial process 
are partly and briefly explained above. But， what makes informal control 
systems necessary originally lies in the ordinary social wor1d which perhaps 
wil1 require a bit more explanation in detail below. 
V A Spiral Development of What Appears 
Horizontally Feedback Relation 
In our daily lives we usually see incredibly tremendous matters， such as 
like houses， buildings， streets， railway， buses， cars and people. They build 
houses， ride on buses， walk along street， enter into buildings， so and so. 
10) 8) 289f. 
1980] AN ESSAY ON HUMAN ENTERPRISE OF LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD 9 
Except “nature"， there are and exist， we see， only men and women and 
matters they artificially created. Then， how about political state， law， and 
social institutions? Only we can find bui1dings built by people， Parliament， 
Supreme Court， and so on， where they come together to do something， in
addition parliamentary documents， statutes， reports. Here and there we only 
glance a few parts of the so時calledstate or law. Nevertheless， we are 
accustomed to say and hear that powerful state stands in our way and the 
law (formal) exists and functions with exact conformity. 1s this merely a 
fictitious picture or products of imagination? Partly， yes， but part1y， no. 
Something must be said on our internal streams of images in order to explain 
this situation. What are internal streams of images? To have a proper 
understanding， perhaps we need to take into consideration a rather longer 
intellectua1 history on this subject. But， here 1 merely refer to a few 
scholars' suggestions. 
1. 1nterna1 streams of images 
円DerBoden des Rechts ist uberhaupt das Geistige und seine nahre 
Stelle und Ausgangspunkt der Wille welcher frei ist.“11) G. W. F. Hegel in 
writing in this way may perhaps offer an illustration for that subject. He 
puts forth: "Die objektive Wirklichkeit des Rechts ist tei1s fur das 
Bewusstsein zu sein， uberhaupt gewusst zu werden . . . .“ 12) It is interesting 
for us to find Hegel emphasizing such a mental (geistig) aspects whi1e 
maintaining his idea of law with positivity， or of positive character. 耳目e，
he appears to suggest main features of law or right being interrelated with 
both aspects of internal and external， or mental and physica1， institutiona1. 
We may again count of names of great scholars， theoreticians like K. Marx， 
G. Simmel， W. Di1they， E. Lask， who in their own parts contributed to that 
subject. 
2. The transitive and the substantive 
At the beginning of this century， however， W. James or M. Weber， 
and a litle bit later， Ed. Husser1 explained their ideas which stil1 now have a 
remarkable meaning. 
11) G. W. F. Hegel， Grundlinien der PhilosophたdesRechts， !i 4 (1821). 
12) 11) !i210. 
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Weber says: 
，，Menschliches (}>如seres< oder }> inneres<) Verhalten zeigt sowohl 
Zusammenhange wie Regelmasigkeiten des Verlaufs wie alles Geschehen. 
Was aber， wenigstens im vollen Sinne， nur menschlichem Verhalten eignet， 
sind Zusammenhange und Regelmasigkeiten， deren Ablauf v e r s t a n d 1 ich
deutbar ist.“13) 
He also writes in "Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft“: 
円Wirsind ja bei "sozialen Gebilden“(im Gegensatz zu "Organismen“) 
in der Lage: u b e r dieblose Feststellung von funktionellen Zusammen-
hangen und Regeln ("Gesetzen“) h i n a u s etwa aller "Naturwissenschaft“ 
(im Sinn der Aufstellung von Kausalregeln fur Geschehnisse und Gebilde und 
der “Erklarung“der Einzelgeschehnisse daraus) ewig Unzugangliches zu 
leisten: eben das "Verstehen“des Verhaltens der beteiligten Einzelnen“14) 
Moreover， we shall only remember key terms，“the substantive parts" 
by comparison with “the transitive parts of the stream of thought" 
(James).1S) and “Noema" by comparison with “Noesis" (耳切serl).16)17) 
3. Mass communication 
From another perspective we can ask as follows: Is real world where we 
live in truly real? It may be a kind of cinical questiOn， but we must keep it 
in mind， because we are inc1ined to be negative to that question by 
remembering the mass media operating situation in our contemporary 
13) M. Weber， Ueber einige Kategorien der verstehend巴nSoziologie (1913)， in: Gesammelte 
Aufsatze zur Wissenschaftslehre， zweite durchgesehne und erganzte Auflage， besorgt von J. 
Winckelmann， 427f (1951). 
14) M. Weber， Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft， 1.Halbband， 4 Aufl.， besorgt von J. Winckelmann， 7 
(1956). 
15) W. James， The Principles of Psychology， Dover Books， vol. 1，243 (1950). 
16) Edmund Husser1， Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und Phanomenologischen Philo-
sophie， 179ff (1913).， Husserliana， Bd.III/l， 200ff (1976). As to the relation of Husser1 to James， see， 
for example， Die Krisis der europaischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phanomenologie， 
Husserliana， Bd. VI， 267 (1976). A. Schutz， On Phenomenology and Social Relations， ed. by H. R. 
Wagner， 56ff (1970). 
17) In th巴contextmentioned in the text， 1 shall add two scholars' achievements who published 
e:rch own first book at the same time， March， 1932， and at the same place， inVienna， which became 
pioneerworks for phenomenologican sociology-A. Schutz， Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt 
(1932)， and T. Otaka， Grundlegung der Lehre vom sozialen Verband (1932). 1 am also grateful to 
Professor J. Tokunaga for suggesting me their intimate relation. 
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society. All day， ifwe want， we can listen radio or watch television. 
Most of our knowledge concerning natural and cultural world we are 
commited to directly or indirectly come from this mass communication 
produced by mass media. So happenings at south pole area， or accidents 
in the Western Europe now are not very far from us， but immediately 
known by us through mass communication as if， we feel， we are actually 
watching them. Those， however sent in an appropriate way， are kind of 
“images"， produced by that media which may leave rather wider space 
for man伊u/，αtion. In this respect， itis not surpring for us to say that we 1ive 
in an imaginal world. But， now we are better to return to the original course 
of consideration. 
4. Circulation? 
Each individuals in society think and act under strong impact of social 
institution including legal， for instance to perform their contractual or 
promissory ob1igation. Each individuals under the law-institution realize 
their each own different ideas， inother words， subjectively intended meaning 
within a contextual stream of the objective meaning through their action 
into the law-institution， which， reified， asa uniquely meaningful institution， 
in turn react to them to control or to give guidance， and旬開嗣. This is not 
only the case with private individuals， but with officials， judges， and so on， 
though different in their each own positions and roles. 
It is sure that this glimpse of our daily surroundings， that is， idea → 
action →institution →idea →action -ー showsa feedback relation develop-
ing between them. Viewed from a different perspective， itmay be better 
to ca11 ita “spiral" development of what appears a feedback relation. 1 shall 
conclude this short paper by paying attention to why spiral. 
5. Others 
In our daily 1ives we are in veηr complex networks of social relationships 
and institutions. Our actions whether social or legal， themselves depend on 
our mutual understanding and re1iance of expectability (predictability) of 
humann activity. What is mutual? It presupposes one-another elation. What 
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is another?18) In a sense， each individuals are similar as far as they are 
human beings. Each of them， itis also sure， isa being of uniqueness. If they 
are characterized by both similarity and uniqueness， then it may be a bit 
easier for us to understand our daily life. By the way， our daily 1ife continu-
iously raisse al kind of conflicts and requires peaceful resolution or regula-
tion of conflicts or disputes， to which， intum， various types of informal and 
formal control systems respond and serve.19) 
6. From objectivation to personification 
Our social as well as legal actions are interwoven with the so-called social 
facts as shown by keeping a promise， making a contract. Analytical1y speak-
ing， itmay be possible tentatively to c1assify each steps by which private 
individuals (officia1s， judges， ---though different in each positions and roles) 
realizes and embodies each own ideas， inother words， subjectively intended 
meanings within an intemal stream of objective meanings through their 
actions， by using symbols， that is， words and phrases， into the law-institu-
tion. Each steps may well be expressed by objectivation， objectification， 
a1ienation， and reification in accordance with P. Berger and S. Pullberg. 1 
would add “personification" of products， that is， institutions. 
“By objectivation we mean that process whereby human subjectivity 
embodies itsel[ in products that are available to onesel[αnd one's [ellow men 
as elements o[ a common world. This process， we must emphasize from the 
beginning， isanthropological1y necessary. --膚
By objecti[ication we mean the moment in the process o[ objectivation 
in which man establishes distance 斤omhis producing and its product， such 
that he can take cognizance o[ it αnd make o[ it αn object o[ his conscious-
ness.園町附田開Thus，for instance， man produces material tools in the process of 
objectivation which he then objectifies by means of language， giving them 
‘a name' that is‘known' to him from then on and that he can communicate 
to others. -----
By alienation we mean the process by which the unity o[ the producing 
and the product is broken. The product now appears to the producer as an 
18) 17) Schutz's work may be stil now helpfuI. 
19) N. Luhmann， Rechtssoziologie， Bd. 1， 31ff (1972). 
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alien facticity and power standing in itself and over against hirn， no Ionger 
recognizable as a product.ー --圃.
By reilication we mean the moment in the process 01 alienation in which 
the characteristic 01 thing“hood becomes the standard 01 objective reali-
ty.円20)
By personification 1 mean the process by which the product by itself 
stands in our way as it were endowed with its will， power， etc.， 1ike each 
individuals. 
7. Ideas →actions →institu tions → 
Sirnilarly， we may perhaps get a considerably total image of dynamic 
relation between us and our surroundings， especially the law-institution by 
using these delicate means for expression， language， that is， ideas → actions 
social as well as legal which are characterized by actual and mental factors → 
the law-institution a bit renewed， modified， developed →ideas →actions --. 
Viewed from horizontal perspective， the whole process means only a circula-
tion of feedback relation. But， each faces newly add something to the origi-
nal resulting gradually to modify and change the process as a whole. It is for 
this reason that 1 cal it a spiral development of what appears horizontally 
feedback relation.21) 
8. Rules and practice 
To look at a 1itle bit c10sely social as well as legal rules， standards， prin-
ciples partly raised by needs of conflict resolution， partly by needs of possi-
ble guidance， they have an interesting structure of their existence within an 
internal stream of objective meanings. As mentioned above， they are only 
assumed or presumed to exist by reference to Parliament， Supreme Court 
working， or parliamentary documents， statutes， reports， and monuments， 
etc. They are rather ascertained through social as wel1 as judicial prac-
tice concerning them.22) Practice? Yes. For instance， social rules are 
20) P. Berger & S. Pullberg， Reific必ionand the sociological critique of consciousness， 35 new 
le)仔review，56， 60f (1966). 
21) As it shown later， a part of this development is forma1ization， legalization. 
22) An interesting approach to this point in terms oi critical legal thought is made by K. Klare， 
Law-making as praxis， 40 Telos， 123 (1979). 
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accepted and acknowledged by some members of that social group wherein 
rules function. Those are not mere regularities but meaningful standards at 
least for some to observe. This is a favorite topic raised and especially 
emphasized by H. L. A. Hart in regard to internal aspect of .social rules by 
contrast to external aspect of social facts.23) This approach reminds us of 
somewhat phenomenological or meaning understanding approach as referred 
above. 
Social as well as legal rules， according to such trends of approach， are 
given shapes in adepth of pure consciousness so that those are accepted as 
ideal or mental forms of existence within an internal stream of conscious-
ness. But， we need again retum to the reality of social facts or social action 
actually experienced by us in order to empiristically ascertain that ideal or 
menta1 images. Then， are we not faced with somewhat similar way of 
enquiries to reconsider one upon another， for instance， social rules not only 
from intemal aspect， but in connection with external， not only from mental 
or ideal aspect， but in connection with actual practice? 
VI Problem of Formalization， Legalization 
Viewed from this perspective， informal and formal control systems may 
be fundamentally a continuous one as well as daily process of human rela“ 
tions and non-daily or extraordinary process coming from social conf1icts. 
Certainly we must keep it in mind that sti1 there remains relatively a great 
difference between modern formal legal system and nonlegal control 
systems at present. This is a remarkable fact even though we don't take a 
legal positivistic point of view or something like. What is worth noticing， 
however， isnot only difference or distinction， but formalizαtion of the 
informal in our daily life and legalization24) or formalization of the nonlegal 
or informal in the process of conf1ict resolution or the process providing for 
possible guidance， which may to some extent correspond that pocess from 
objectivation to personification. A spiral development of some factors， that 
is， ideas → actions →institutions →， though very simple scheme， may serve 
23) H. L. A. Hart， The Concept of Law， 54ff (1961). See also P. M. S. Hacker， Hart's philosophy 
oflaw， in:law， Morality， and Society， ed.by Hack巴r& J. Raz， 9ff (1977) 
24) See Yasaki and T. Yagi，Introduction to Legal Philosphy (Japanese version)， 59 (1978). 
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for our understanding of that process. 
Many times such a developmet meets a strong rejection， itmay be 
after al brought back to a starting point， or furthermore. But， step by step， 
those facters spirally develops in the way of legislation， judicial decision， or
administrative decision. To add a few words， way of such a development 
may take slightly or greatly different courses in accordance with types of 
1aw in a society-types， which are c1assified into customary or interactiona1 
1aw， regu1atory or bureaucratic law， lega1 order or 1ega1 system according to 
R. M. Unger，2S) and into responsive 1aw， repressive law， autonomous law 
according to P. Nonet and P. Se1znick26) 
Even legal system， autonomous law which are most1y equiva1ent to the 
forma1 municipa11aw in this paper， 1eaves a wider range of spaces for infor-
ma1 factors working. I幽4，informa1 judgement which is typical1y made in the 
so-called hard case is an il1uminating examp1e. To use an expression as 
remarked above， a judge， facing with hard case， may make a judicial opinion 
according to subjective1y intended meaning of the matter with in an interna1 
stream of objective meaning which may a1so be called va1ue system， or 
conventiona1 mora1ity， or sometimes princip1es. As to such a type of 1aw， 
however， itis worth noticing that judge's decision even in such a hard case 
is not a1ways arbitrary， and that even though arbitrary in the original case， it
comes to be formalized or legalized due to the judicial precedent網making
function of judicia1 court. 
If it is the case with 1ega1 system， autonomous law， then much more with 
other types， interactiona1 or responsive 1aw， and bureaucratic or repressive 
1aw. At first g1ance， the former appears more e1astic to accept and adapt 
to various informa1 contr01 systems coming from socia1 needs rather than the 
1atter. Here too， we must be careful about delicate combination of each 
different 1eve1s of informal contr01 system (for instance， I-1， 2， 3， 4， ) with 
at 1east three differing types of law which wil1 make an attractive task in 
jurisprudence. To the tasks in jurisprudence our approach may perhaps 
make some contribution. 1 shall finish my simp1e essay by listing possible 
contributions as follows: 
1. Understanding of complex consciousness existing under individua1s 
25) R. M. Unger， Law in Modern Society， 1976. 
26) P. Nonet & P. Selznick， Law and Society in 1子ansition:Toward Responsive Law， 1978. 
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on law， state， society， etc. 
2. Clarification of socio-cu1tural context for interpretation and applica幽
tion of law. 
3. Providing for justification or critique of contemporary community 
standard， a public morality， etc. as used in judicial decision. 
4. Providing for some perspectives in dealing with purposes， values， 
ideologies in regard to law. 
